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Abstract
I examine the eect of marriage penalties in the US income tax system on marital
status. I construct a simulated instrument that exploits variation in the tax code
over time and between US states to deal with potential endogeneity between the
marriage penalty a couple faces and their marital status. I nd that a $1000 increase
in the marriage penalty faced reduces the probability of marriage by 1.7 percentage
points, an eect four times larger than previously estimated. Those in the lowest
education groups respond by as much as 2.7 percentage points, with the average
response declining as education increases.
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1 Introduction
The structure of the American family has changed substantially since the 1960s.
One important trend is the decline in marriage and concurrent increase in cohabi-
tation (Kennedy & Bumpass 2008). This transition is a source of concern for many
commentators since there is a substantial body of research relating marriage to
better health, more wealth and fewer social problems (Waite & Gallagher 2000).
As a result, substantial federal funds have been devoted to marriage promotion,
often specically targeted at unmarried cohabiting parents.1
It is well documented that the US personal income tax system is not neutral
to marriage: there are both marriage penalties and subsidies (Alm, Dickert-Conlin
& Whittington 1999). The extent of these penalties and subsidies has changed
signicantly with changes in federal and state income taxes and the Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC), and they can be a large proportion of income, especially for
low income couples (Eissa & Hoynes 2000a).
Marriage taxes have been linked to various choices, including decisions about
partnering and partnership type.2 Individuals facing a marriage penalty are less
likely to be married (Alm & Whittington 1995, Alm & Whittington 1999), more
likely to delay marriage (Sjoquist & Walker 1995, Alm & Whittington 1996a), and
more likely to divorce (Whittington & Alm 1997, Dickert-Conlin 1999), although the
eects found are modest. Much of this work has focused on the margin between
being single and being partnered. However, with substantial concern about the
higher instability and poorer outcomes of unmarried couples, the margin between
cohabitation and legal marriage is of interest. Two papers have directly addressed
this margin. Alm &Whittington (1999) nd that a higher marriage penalty reduces
the probability of a cohabiting couple making the transition to marriage, whilst
1The Healthy Marriage Initiative (HMI) has $150 million per annum to devote to marriage promotion.
One key programme supported, Building Stronger Families, is specically directed at unmarried parents
in romantic relationships. The HMI programmes have been accused of promoting legal marriage over all
other relationship types, regardless of the consequences (Furstenberg 2007).
2Marriage penalties in the tax system have also been linked to female labour supply (LaLumia 2008,
Crossley & Jeon 2007), the allocation of unearned income between spouses (Stephens &Ward-Batts 2004)
and fertility (Whittington, Alm & Peters 1990, Dickert-Conlin & Chandra 1999).
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Eissa & Hoynes (2000b) report that a $1000 increase in the marriage penalty is
associated with a 0.4 percentage point reduction in the probability of marriage
relative to cohabitation.
However, these estimates treat a couple's marriage penalty as exogenous. If the
marriage penalty experienced is correlated with unobserved characteristics which
also aect the marriage decision, these estimates may be biased. The results pre-
sented in this paper directly address this issue by exploiting the variation in mar-
riage penalties between states and over time resulting from changes to federal and
state income taxes, including the EITC.
Using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1984 to 2008, I nd
that a $1000 increase in the marriage penalty causes a 1.7 percentage point fall in
the probability of marriage. This response is more than four times greater than
previous estimates. This masks heterogeneity: for those in the lowest educational
groups the fall is as much as 2.7 percentage points, with the response declining as
education increases. This suggests that a nancial incentive for marriage might be
more successful at increasing marriage rates than previously thought.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the interaction of marital
status with the income tax system and explains how this might aect marital status
decisions. Section 3 describes my data and sets out my empirical strategy, including
construction of the simulated instrument. Results are presented in section 4, and
section 5 concludes.
2 Marriage and the tax system
The US federal personal income tax system is not neutral towards marriage as it
combines a progressive income tax schedule and taxation on the basis of family
income. This means that, when married, a couple's tax liability is based on its
combined income. Where only one partner works, this might lead to a subsidy to
marriage since the worker's income falls into a lower tax bracket than if he were
single. However, the federal tax code also leads to marriage penalties for some
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couples, since the tax brackets in the married schedule are less than twice as large
as those in the single schedule: if a couple earn equal incomes, their combined
income will be in a higher married tax bracket than their tax brackets on the single
schedule. The more equal a couple's incomes, the more likely they will experience
a marriage penalty in the federal income tax system.
Crucially for this study, it is the legal marital status which determines whether
a couple les their tax return as married or single.3 This means that a cohabiting
but unmarried couple can avoid a marriage penalty by remaining unmarried, whilst
still gaining the economies of scale and other benets of living in one household.
The magnitude of marriage penalties and subsidies in the federal income tax
system has varied substantially over time. This can be seen in gure 1, which
shows the average marriage penalties faced by couples in a sample from the CPS
(described below) from 1984 to 2008. On average, a marriage subsidy existed
in the mid 1980s, which steadily increased through the 1990s. The impact of the
Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003, which eliminated marriage penalties resulting from
dierences in the lowest two tax brackets, are clearly reected in the large fall in the
average penalty faced at this time. However, this discussion obscures substantial
heterogeneity. In 1994, the average marriage penalty was $350 per annum, but 60%
of couples suered an average $1200 tax penalty, whilst 30% of couples enjoyed an
average subsidy of $1100 (Alm & Whittington 1996b).
There are two main factors driving changes in the marriage penalty over time.
First, there are changes to the tax code. These include the Tax Reform Act of
1986 (TRA86), which reduced the progressivity of the income tax system and so
reduced average marriage penalties, and the tax acts of 1990 and 1993 (OBRA90
and OBRA93) which extended the EITC and increased the progressivity of the
tax system, especially amongst those with low incomes. This drove the increase in
average experienced penalties through the 1990s. In addition to changes in the tax
code, demographic change, namely the increasing labour market participation of
3A married couple may choose to le jointly or separately. The rate schedule for married ling
separately is exactly half that for married ling jointly, so ling separately does not reverse the marriage
penalty.
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Figure 1: Average marriage penalties over time
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Average marriage penalties by year for the CPS sample. The average penalty increases
due to the expansion of the EITC. The Bush tax cuts in 2003 dramatically reduce the
marriage penalties
women, contributes to the upward trend in average marriage penalties through the
1980s and 1990s. Eissa & Hoynes (2000a) estimate that from 1984 to 1997, changes
to the tax code explain 55-60% of the change in the average marriage penalty, with
the remainder explained by female labour force participation. It is the changes in
penalties caused directly by changes to the tax code that I exploit in this paper.
In addition to the marriage penalties and subsidies created by the federal income
tax system, there is further variation in the marriage penalties faced by couples
generated by state income tax systems. Whilst some states have no income tax or
a at rate income tax at the individual level and so do not create any additional
marriage tax or penalty, other states have a code which either amplies or mitigates
the federal marriage penalty. For example, California has a state income tax system
in which the tax brackets for married couples are twice those for singles, and so
only marriage subsidies are possible. These can mitigate the federal penalty. In
contrast, other states have tax brackets when ling as married which are less than
twice those for singles, and so can add to the federal marriage penalty (see appendix
B of Congressional Budget Oce (1997) for more information).
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In addition to state income tax systems, some states also apply their own Earned
Income Tax Credit, typically as a proportion of the federal EITC. These are at
varying levels and have been introduced and changed at dierent times in dierent
states (see Leigh (2010) for more information). Since ling as single or married can
change tax liabilities by the full amount of EITC, this adds to the variation in the
marriage penalty between states in a given time period, and to the asymmetry of
changes in the penalty between states and over time.
2.1 Marriage penalties and marital status
Whilst couples with higher income generally experience higher absolute marriage
penalties, penalties as a percentage of income are higher for low income couples:
on average 7.6% of income for couples with less than $20,000 per annum income
(Eissa & Hoynes 2000a). The lower income couples are also those who have been
most aected by expansions of EITC (Holtzblatt & Rebelein 2000). The decision
to marry is more commonly associated with factors other than taxes, but with po-
tentially large tax implications of the choice of marital status, the marriage penalty
may well feature in people's decisions about the legal status of their relationship.4
There are several mechanisms through which this might work.
First, the prospect of a marriage penalty may discourage an individual from
entering into a cohabiting relationship regardless of its legal status. Various stud-
ies have suggested that this is the case, although the eect is modest (Alm &
Whittington 1995, Alm & Whittington 1999). In the shorter term, a couple may
merely delay their marriage until the following tax year in response to the marriage
penalty faced: again this eect is thought to be modest (Sjoquist & Walker 1995,
Alm & Whittington 1996a).
Second, a couple may decide to forego legal marriage in order to minimise tax
liabilities, yet still live together in unmarried cohabitation. Alternatively, it might
be the case that a couple's transition from cohabitation to legal marriage is inu-
4Similar penalties exist in the benets system. There is an extensive literature considering the impact
of such penalties on the prevalence of single parent families. See Dickert-Conlin (1999) and Mott (1998).
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enced by the marriage penalty they face: the higher the penalty, the longer they
remain unmarried. Alm & Whittington (2003) address these two mechanisms using
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and nd that whilst the initial choice
between marriage and cohabitation is not aected by the magnitude of the marriage
penalty faced, the choice to make the transition from cohabitation to marriage is
modestly inuenced by the marriage penalty faced. Eissa & Hoynes (2000b) use
CPS data and nd that a $1000 higher marriage penalty is associated with a 0.4
percentage point lower probability of marriage relative to cohabitation.
Finally, the presence of a marriage penalty may inuence relationship break-
down: facing a large marriage penalty might make a married couple more likely to
divorce and the couple either become single, or repartner without remarrying. On
the other hand, a cohabiting couple who would face a marriage subsidy if married
might be more likely to separate and nd partners who they can marry to gain that
subsidy.
With the exception of the choice to remain single or enter a coresidential rela-
tionship, all of these mechanisms suggest that when a couple faces a larger marriage
penalty, we are more likely to observe them as unmarried cohabitants than as a
married couple: they may simply not marry, spend more years cohabiting than they
otherwise would, or may divorce. So, in states and time periods where marriage
penalties are higher, we should observe a higher proportion of cohabiting couples
than in states and time periods where marriage penalties are lower.
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
I use the March supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1984
to 2008. The CPS interviews around 50,000 households each month, collecting the
income data I require in the March survey. This provides a large repeated cross
section. If a couple's choice between marriage and unmarried cohabitation is inu-
enced by the marriage penalty faced, the penalty of interest should be the expected
marriage penalty at the time of the decision. Unfortunately my data do not al-
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low me to observe transitions, or to observe the length of relationships. I instead
observe the stock of married and cohabiting couples at each point in time. This
approach would be valid if all individuals reoptimize in each period, with the option
of separating and entering an equivalent relationship where legal status could be
freely chosen.5 Also, as argued above, the mechanisms by which marriage penalties
discourage marriage will aect the stocks of married and cohabiting couples in a
consistent manner.
My sample consists of individuals in coresidential relationships where both part-
ners are between 18 and 50 years old. A couple is married if both partners report
being married and residing with a spouse. Other individuals are classied as un-
married cohabitants.6 Prior to 1993 the CPS does not record which couples are
unmarried cohabitees. I infer cohabitation by considering non-relative partners and
roommates where there are just two opposite sex adults in the household. Once it is
possible for respondents to declare themselves to be unmarried partners, the num-
ber of cohabitors inferred in this way falls dramatically. So overall my data suggest
a smooth upward trend in the proportion of my sample cohabiting, as shown in
gure 2, reecting previous research.
In addition to individual level data, I use census data and projections from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics to calculate sex ratios. These are grouped by year,
state, age and race, and are used in my analysis to control for local marriage market
conditions.7 A higher value of this sex ratio indicates better odds on the relationship
market.
Some measure of social norms for marriage should be included as a control
variable in my estimation. Unfortunately the CPS does not provide a rich set of
potential controls (for example, religion is not recorded). I proxy social norms using
a couple's location: living in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA), or a city within
5Whilst there is anecdotal evidence of couples divorcing and subsequently cohabiting (Waite &
Gallagher 2000), it seems more reasonable to imagine couples separating and repartnering with another
(similar) partner.
6Those not residing with a partner are discarded, including those reporting being married with spouse
not present.
7Prior to 1990 my data is grouped into ve-year age groups.
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Figure 2: Proportion of CPS sample cohabiting
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Proportion of selected sample of couples who are cohabiting. In line with reported
trends, the proportion of my CPS sample cohabiting rises steadily over the period.
There is no spike in this proportion in 1993 when it became possible for couples to
report being unmarried cohabitants.
an MSA. It is expected that more traditional values will hold outside of large cities.
After eliminating observations with missing data, I am left with a sample of
570,751 couples, of whom 54,758 are unmarried. Average characteristics by sex
and marital status are given in table 1. Cohabitees are on average younger, slightly
less educated, more likely to be nonwhite and have fewer children than those who
are married. Whilst married men have higher income than their cohabiting coun-
terparts, the opposite is true for women.
3.1 Calculation of marriage penalties
I calculate marriage tax penalties for all couples in my sample using the NBER
TAXSIM program8 A couple's marriage penalty is the dierence between their tax
liabilities when married and when cohabiting. It is not immediately obvious how
to calculate these tax liabilities: a married couple's liability is only observed when
they are married, and so assumptions must be made about how their income and
8See http://www.nber.org/taxsim/ and Feenberg & Coutts (1993) for more details.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Married Cohabiting
Men
Age 37.54 (7.45) 32.22 (8.05)
Education (years) 13.23 (2.57) 12.70 (2.30)
Non white 0.12 (0.32) 0.18 (0.39)
Earnings ($000) 41.14 (40.08) 25.61 (26.78)
Sex ratio (women/men) 1.00 (0.07) 0.99 (0.08)
Women
Age 35.62 (7.48) 30.57 (8.18)
Education (years) 13.23 (2.47) 12.91 (2.25)
Non white 0.12 (0.32) 0.17 (0.38)
Earnings ($000) 16.75 (21.98) 17.03 (19.17)
Sex ratio (men/women) 1.01 (0.07) 1.02 (0.09)
Household
Household earnings ($000) 61.04 (52.85) 44.57 (40.12)
Dependent children 1.46 (1.20) 0.79 (1.09)
Marriage Penalty ($)
Total -567.8 (2977) -64.3 (1845)
Low education -728.4 (2472) -252.6 (1874)
Medium education -528.7 (2841) 52.8 (1721)
High education -343.5 (3737) 356.2 (1862)
Observations 516003 54748
1. Calculations from 1985-2008 CPS
2. Standard deviations in parentheses
3. Dollar amounts in 1997$
4. Low education - no college; medium education - some college; high education -
advanced degree
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dependents would be split between them if they are unmarried.
I assume that if a married couple were unmarried, the wife would have custody
of any children, and so would le as head of household, whilst the husband would
le as a single. Any unearned income is split equally. This method follows Eissa &
Hoynes (2000b) and Alm et al. (1999).
Other approaches taken in calculating the marriage penalty are to assume that
the couple arranges their aairs so as to minmise their tax liability (Feenberg
& Rosen 1995), and to assume that the higher earner les as head of household
(Holtzblatt & Rebelein 2000). My choice reects the empirical method, as discussed
by Holtzblatt & Rebelein (2000): since women generally take primary custody of
children on relationship breakdown, I assume that it is the female who will claim
the child exemption.9
I calculate marriage penalties using actual earnings and numbers of children
reported in the CPS: this assumes that a couple's behaviour does not change with
its marital status. Whilst this is a strong assumption, it seems reasonable to assume
that cohabiting individuals change their behaviour less on getting married than
those who were previously single and living alone. TAXSIM calculates federal and
state tax liabilities, including the EITC. All transfers are assumed to be zero.10
Table 1 reports the average marriage penalties by marital status. A negative
number indicates a marriage subsidy. Married couples face an average marriage tax
subsidy of $568, with the lowest educational group having a subsidy of $728 and
the highest educational group at $344.11 In contrast, cohabiting couples face an
average subsidy of just $64 per year. This disguises substantial variation between
educational groups: whilst the lowest education couples have an average subsidy
of $253, the highest educational group suer an average penalty of $356. Large
standard deviations for all of these estimates reect substantial variation in the
9Replicating the results in this paper with marriage penalties calculated assuming that children are
allocated to minimise total tax liability does not change the conclusions reached.
10This will aect the results of those on low incomes. See Eissa & Hoynes (2000b) for some suggestive
results when transfers are included.
11Average subsidies here are driven by the inclusion of years after the Bush tax cuts: before 2002
married couples had an average subsidy of $373, whilst cohabiting couples faced an average penalty of
$170.
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subsidies and penalties faced.
3.2 Empirical strategy
A couple chooses to marry, rather than to cohabit, if the expected joint utility
from marriage exceeds that from cohabitation. Since joint utility is assumed to
be increasing in income, a couple is less likely to be married as their marriage tax
penalty increases. I model the expected excess joint utility from marriage over
cohabitation as an index function Mist, indexed by individual (i), state of residence
(s) and year (t):
Mist = Penaltyist + Xist + "ist (1)
where Penaltyist is the marriage tax penalty faced by the couple, Xist is a vector
of covariates aecting marriage probability, and "ist is an iid error term. Mist is an
indicator variable representing whether a couple is married or not:
Mist =
8>><>>:
1 if Mist > 0
0 if Mist  0
(2)
I begin by assuming that the marriage penalty a couple faces is exogenous from
their marital status, and estimate a probit model. However, these probit estimates
are potentially subject to bias. The marriage penalty a couple experience might
be correlated with other characteristics which inuence the marital status choice.
For example, highly educated couples may be more likely to experience a marriage
penalty, as both may be more likely to work. Highly educated couples may also
be more likely to marry as a result of their social background. This might lead
to underestimation of the extent to which marriage is discouraged by a marriage
penalty. To address this endogeneity of marital status and the marriage penalty
faced, I also present instrumental variables estimates. I use simulated instruments:
I simulate the marriage penalty in every state and year for a random sample of
couples, and so calculate an average marrige penalty for each state and year which
12
Figure 3: Instrument { penalties based on policy
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Graph shows average marriage penalty from federal income taxes for same random
sample of 500 couples in each year. Also shown are the average marriage penalties for
these couples if they are in California (smallest average penalty over the period) or DC
(largest average penalty over the period).
reects the tax code and not the economic or demographic characteristics of the
state and year.12 I therefore exploit the variation in marriage penalties resulting
from tax code changes and between-state variation in income taxes and the EITC.
Figure 3 illustrates the instrument. The middle line shows the federal marriage
penalty for a constant sample. The policy changes can be seen, but the pattern is
less pronounced than in gure 1, since there the policy changes are reinforced by
demographic change (see Eissa & Hoynes (2000a)). I also include the instrument
for California and DC, with these two regions having the highest and lowest average
marriage penalty over the period respectively. This shows the variation between
states. Whilst states' total marriage penalties mostly move in line with the federal
12I randomly select 500 couples from my 1998 sample. I then nd the average penalty for this selected
group in each state and for each year. I take the average penalty in each state and year, giving a set of
1275 state-year averages which capture the policy variation in marriage penalties over the period. This is
a similar strategy to that used by Currie & Gruber (1996) who capture dierences in children's Medicaid
eligibility between states using just one sample of children.
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penalty, there is some variation in the extent of the changes.
Whilst this strategy deals with the endogeneity problem described above, and
with the problem of individual-level omitted variable bias, there is still concern over
omitted variables which are correlated with changes in state and federal marriage
penalties and dierences in the probability of being married. I include state xed
eects and state specic time trends in order to capture dierence levels and trends
in marriage between states.
In my instrumental variables estimates the marriage penalty faced is a modelled
as a function of the simulated instrument Penaltyst:
Penaltyist = Penaltyst + Xist + ist (3)
I estimate the model by assuming that "ist and ist are jointly normally dis-
tributed with covariance  and using full information maximum likelihood. This
eectively instruments the marriage penalty faced with the average penalty in the
relevant state and time period. Xist is a vector of individual and local charac-
teristics which inuence the choice between marriage and cohabitation including
demographic characteristics, income measures, the sex ratio, size of town or city
and state xed eects and time trends.
4 Marriage penalties and marital status
Estimates of the eect of marriage penalties on marital status, split by sex, are
presented in table 2. The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual is
married or zero if cohabiting.
Column 1 shows the association between the marriage penalty faced and marital
status without controlling for observable characteristics. A $1,000 increase in the
penalty faced is associated with a 0.6 percentage point fall in the probability of being
married. Columns 2 and 4 introduce a set of controls including state xed eects
and state time trends. This reduces the correlation between the marriage penalty
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Table 2: Eect of the marriage penalty on marital status
Men Women
Raw Probit Probit (IV) Probit Probit (IV)
Marital status (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Penalty ($000) -0.0058 -0.0023 -0.0167 -0.0023 -0.0170
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0003) (0.0014)
Education -0.0157 -0.0143 -0.0170 -0.0151
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0010)
Education2 0.0009 0.0008 0.0009 0.0008
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Age 0.0095 0.0099 0.0113 0.0118
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Age2 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Black -0.0514 -0.0490 -0.0376 -0.0347
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040)
Other race* -0.0111 -0.0094 -0.0077 -0.0063
(0.0092) (0.0096) (0.0073) (0.0077)
Children -0.0027 -0.0080 -0.0011 -0.0065
(0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0014)
Children under 17 0.0355 0.0379 0.0337 0.0361
(0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0014)
Sex ratio -0.0205 -0.0153 0.0383 0.0324
(0.0117) (0.0105) (0.0098) (0.0097)
Own wages 0.0012 0.0007 -0.0005 0.0010
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Partner's wages -0.0001 0.0013 0.0014 0.0009
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Time trend -0.0044 -0.0052 -0.0047 -0.0055
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Joint estimation No No Yes No Yes
Test of instrument 2795 2819
Estimated  0.2199 0.2248
Mean of married 0.90 0.90
1. Table reports marginal eects from probit estimation. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses
2. Other controls: quadratic and interaction terms in wages, dividend, property and unemployment income,
size of city (3 dummies), state dummies, state time trends
3. Other race: not white or black
4. Bold indicates signicance at 5% level
5. Joint estimation denotes joint estimation of marriage equation and penalty equation. Estimation from
penalty equation available on request
6. Test of instrument gives chi-squared statistic from test that the instrument's coecient is equal to zero
in the marriage penalty equation
7. 570751 observations
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experienced and marital status: the estimated fall in the propensity to marry for
a $1000 increase int he penalty faced is reduced from 0.6 to 0.2 percentage points
for both men and women.
In columns 3 and 5, I present estimates which control for the potential en-
dogeneity between marital status and the experienced marriage penalty. When I
instrument for the penalty experienced with my simulated instrument, I nd a much
larger eect: a 1.7 percentage point reduction in the probability of marriage for a
$1000 increase in the penalty. This suggests that the marriage penalty and marital
status are indeed endogenous. There is selection into marriage on unobservable
characteristics which also inuence the marriage penalty. The correlations shown
in columns 2 and 4 underestimate the magnitude of the true eect. This is in con-
trast to selection on observable characteristics (seen by the change in coecients
moving from column 1 to columns 2 and 4): for example, older people are more
likely to be married and to have a smaller marriage penalty, so merely controlling
for age reduces the estimated eect of the marriage penalty.
To be condent that the identication achieved is due to variation in the sim-
ulated instrument, it is important to consider the signicance of the instrument
in the penalty equation (equation 3 above). The simulated instrument is strongly
positively correlated with the actual penalty faced: the chi-squared statistics from
the tests of the signicance of the coecient on the instrument are reported in
table 2. Both are far in excess of 1013 and so I conclude that the average marriage
penalty is a strong instrument for the actual penalty faced.
The joint estimation of the two equations also allows for a test of the exogeneity
of the actual marriage penalty faced. The correlation between the error terms
() in the two equations is estimated to be signicantly positive (around 0.22),
supporting the hypothesis that there are unobserved characteristics which increase
the likelihood of marriage and the size of the penalty faced.
Throughout this estimation I control for demographic characteristics including
13Angrist & Pischke (2009) suggest an F-statistic in excess of 10 is sucient to be condent of a strong
instrument.
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Table 3: Eect of the marriage penalty on marital status: by education
Education Raw Probit Probit (IV) Inst.  Mean
group N (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Men
Low 268021 -0.0082 -0.0027 -0.0265 1733 0.2460 0.881
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0027)
Medium 142081 -0.0069 -0.0021 -0.0122 1374 0.1515 0.903
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0028)
High 160649 -0.0038 -0.0017 -0.0065 2749 0.1911 0.944
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0015)
Women
Low 265410 -0.0097 -0.0023 -0.0220 1746 0.2219 0.892
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0022)
Medium 155509 -0.0090 -0.0034 -0.0164 2061 0.1874 0.900
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0028)
High 149832 -0.0025 -0.0011 -0.0048 2001 0.1368 0.935
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0013)
1. Table reports marginal eect of marriage penalty ($1000) on marriage probability from probit estima-
tion. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses
2. Other controls as in table 2
3. Bold indicates signicance at 5% level
4. Column 5 gives chi-squared statistic from test of coecient on the instrument being equal to zero in
marriage penalty equation
5. Low education: no college education; medium education: some college education; high education: 4
years of college education or more
6. Column 6 shows mean of married dummy for each group
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education, age, race, children and the sex ratio faced. Controlling for income is
important since the actual marriage penalty faced is a function of income, albeit
highly nonlinear. Table 2 reects previous literature in nding that being older,
white, having more dependents and having a higher income is associated with a
higher probability of marriage. Marriage rates have also been falling over time.
Women are more likely to be married given a favourable marriage market, whilst
men do not appear to exploit a strong marriage market to choose a particular
relationship status (given that they are in a coresidential relationship).
Table 3 presents results from separate regressions within three educational
groups: those with no college education (low), those with some college education
(medium) and those with 4 years or more college education (high). This allows
us to consider the dierential eects at dierent socioeconomic levels. This table
reinforces the ndings from the full sample, but highlights heterogeneity. Columns
1 and 2 show that the marriage penalty is more strongly correlated with marital
status for the low and medium education groups than for the highest education
group. The dierences between groups are even more pronounced in the causal
eects shown in column 4: low education individuals are 2.7 (men) or 2.2 (women)
percentage points less likely to marry if their marriage penalty increases by $1000
(around 2.5% of their household earnings), whilst the response for the highest edu-
cational group is 0.7 (men) or 0.5 (women) percentage points (where $1000 is around
1.2% of their household earnings). These results together show that the potential
for nancial incentives to induce more marriages is much larger than previously
thought.
5 Conclusion
This paper estimates the extent to which marriage penalties discourage marriage in
favour of unmarried cohabitation. It explicitly deals with the potential endogeneity
between marital status and the marriage penalty experienced by using a simulated
instrument. I nd that a $1,000 increase in the marriage penalty reduces the
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probability of marriage by around 1.7 percentage points. This estimate is more
than four times greater than that found in the existing literature, and is the rst
estimate to deal with endogeneity. Providing nancial incentives can aect marital
status decisions and so increase the marriage rate.
This result has strong implications for policy in the context of concern about
declining marriage rates and family values. Although there are many more personal
and probably more important reasons for getting married, there is real potential for
increasing the marriage rate through the provision of nancial incentives. However,
this paper does not provide evidence to suggest whether the additional marriages
caused by a nancial incentive are desirable. Whilst there is a wealth of evidence
suggesting strong correlations between marital status and various benecial out-
comes (Waite & Gallagher 2000), the causality is often not clear (see Ribar (2004)
for a survey of some evidence). There should be particular concern about the
marriages induced by nancial incentives since they will be marginal marriages: a
couple motivated by the nancial incentive may not change any behaviour beyond
gaining the marriage certicate and the tax benet. On the other hand, if the pro-
cess of getting married is of itself transformative, either to the individuals involved
or to the attitudes they encounter from others, then a direct nancial subsidy to
marriage may have desirable outcomes.
A further issue raised by the analysis in this paper is that couples are able to,
and choosing to, alter their legal marital status to aect their tax liabilities. It is
widely agreed that the tax code should treat families with equal income equally to
achieve horizontal equity (Eissa & Hoynes 2000a). With the increasing prevalence
of cohabitation, using legal marriage as the marker by which families are dened
may no longer achieve this goal.
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